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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
T HIS note endeavors to define the phrase "doing business"
as it applies to foreign corporations with contacts in Colo-
rado. Depending on how much activity is involved, an out-of-
state corporation may be subjected to three possible liabilities:
the jurisdiction of local courts, qualification with local stand-
ards, and taxation by the state government. Since each liability
requires a different degree of activity, it is possible to be
"doing business" for service of process purposes and yet avoid
the restrictions of qualification and taxation.
To determine the liabilities of a foreign corporation in
Colorado it is necessary to analyze individually these three
areas on a factual basis. Although the statutory guidelines
are considered in each section, their tendency to be general
and overly broad necessitates a concentration on case ma-
terials. Because the facts are of extreme importance in a
determination of "doing business," it is presumptuous, if not
impossible, to formulate a precise, consistent definition of the
term. Nevertheless, an analysis of what the Colorado courts
historically have considered to be significant contacts will
narrow the possible interpretations of the phrase.
The section on service of process has been subdivided
into tort and contract to reflect a distinction necessitated by
the 1965 long arm statute. The introduction of the "tortious
act" test by this statute has expanded Colorado's jurisdiction
to reach out-of-state manufacturers and has created a new
standard of liability. Qualification for "doing business" in-
volves procedural as well as substantive considerations due to
the doctrine of abatement. Taxation must be dissected into
sales and use, income, and franchise taxes to appreciate the
individual complexity of each. In contrast to the qualification
issue, the taxation of foreign corporations possesses great po-
tential for expansion in Colorado.
Overriding the statutory and case law of Colorado are the
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constitutional interpretations of the United States Supreme
Court. For service of process, "minimum contacts" is the gen-
eral standard which must be met. Qualification and taxation
are limited by the "undue burden on interstate commerce"
test which prohibits unrestricted regulation and taxation of
foreign corporations. This note will show that several Colo-
rado statutes exceed these limitations, especially in the area
of taxation.
I. SERVICE OF PROCESS
A. Constitutional Premise
In questions of service of process and jurisdiction, there
are two requirements which must be met to satisfy due process
of law: actual notice and minimum contacts. The modern "no-
tice" test has evolved from the case of Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co.' in which the Supreme Court held mere
publication to be unsatisfactory by stating that "It]he notice
must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required
information . . . and it must afford a reasonable time for those
interested to make their appearance . . 2
The "minimum contacts" test is more difficult to charac-
terize because of the varying application and interpretation
given it by the courts. The leading case, which introduced the
theory of "contacts" as opposed to "presence," is International
Shoe Co. v. Washington3 in which the Supreme Court held that
to subject a person, corporate or otherwise, to in personam
jurisdiction it must be proven that the party has "certain mini-
mum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' ,,4 This basic holding was supplemented by
a "systematic and continuous" test for the contacts5 and a recog-
nition that the "quality and nature of the activity" would be as
carefully considered as the quantity of the activity.6
The greatest extension of the "minimum contacts" test
appeared in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.7 which
maintained that "[i]t is sufficient for purposes of due process
that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial
connection with that State."s This expansive holding was
1 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
2 Id. at 314.
3 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4 Id. at 316.
5 Id. at 320.
6 Id. at 319.
7 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
s Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
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quickly restricted in Hanson v. DencklaO which narrowed the
definition of the "quality" of a contact by holding that "it is
essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within the forum State, thus invoking the bene-
fits and protections of its laws."10
B. Colorado Statutory Law
1. Notice
Colorado's service of process statutes for unqualified cor-
porations have had a turbulent history. Because the purpose
of this note is to determine the law as it exists today, it is
sufficient to note that in 1964 the then-current foreign cor-
poration service statutes were challenged and found to be un-
constitutional for failing to satisfy the due process test of
proper notice.'1 Under those statutes, "notice" consisted of
informing the Secretary of State, who then forwarded the
process by mail to the last known address of the foreign
corporation. Notice was deemed complete when the process
was mailed. Obviously, this method failed to meet the Mullane
requirements of "reasonable to convey" and "reasonable time."
Currently, there are two statutes of importance in this area.
The first is section 31-9-19(3) (a), the statute for service of
process on unqualified foreign corporations.1 2 Service may be
personal or by registered or certified mail. If by mail, notice
will not be complete until:
[F]iling with the clerk of the court from which such process is-
sued of the corporation's return receipt or, in the event the corpo-
ration refuses to accept such registered or certified mail, upon
the filing of such mail with the corporation's refusal to accept
indicated thereon .... 13
Thus, the burden of ensuring satisfactory notice has been
shifted from the Secretary of State to the party bringing suit.
The second important Colorado statute is section 37-1-26, the
long arm statute of 1965.14 Service under this statute must be
9 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
10 Id. at 253 (emphasis added). For a general discussion of service of
process on foreign corporations see Note, Developments in the Law -
State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1960) and Note, Jurisdic-
tion over a Foreign Corporation, 19 S.C.L. REV. 806 (1967).
11 See Clemens v. District Court, 154 Colo. 176, 390 P.2d 83 (1964) (hold-
ing Co.o. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-8 (Supp. 1961) unconstitutional);
Leach v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 231 F. Supp. 157 (D. Colo. 1964)
(holding COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-35-19(3) (Supp. 1960) unconsti-
tutional).
12 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-19(3) (a) (Supp. 1965). Subsections (1)
and (2) deal with qualified corporations.
13 Id.
14 Id. §§ 37-1-26 to -27.
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personal- not by mail. The importance of this distinction will
be discussed later.
2. Minimum Contacts
The second issue, minimum contacts, appears in sections
31-9-19 and 37-1-26. The test common to both laws is "trans-
acting business." For this note, it is most important to consider
section 37-1-26 which subjects any person "whether or not a
resident of the state of Colorado . .. to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state, concerning any cause of action arising from:
(b) The transaction of any business within the state; (c) The
commission of a tortious act within this state . . .
The legal problem in interpreting these statutes centers
on the determination of what constitutes "transacting busi-
ness."1 6 For each state this phrase has different connotations.
Perhaps the most cautious assessment of this phrase was made
by the Colorado Supreme Court:
[T]he one rule which permeates all of the decisions, in which the
question as to whether a foreign corporation is doing business in
a state other than that in which it was chartered, is that each
case depends upon its own facts.1
7
With this premise in mind, the analysis which follows will
examine the facts of various cases in an attempt to ascertain
the characteristic factors which influence the courts. The dis-
cussion is separated into tort and contract because of the cre-
ation in section 37-1-26 of a new test for tort actions involving
foreign corporations.
C. Colorado Case Law
1. Tort
In tort, the 1965 long arm statute's "tortious act" test ex-
panded the state's potential jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions. Prior to this act, it was necessary to establish "minimum
contacts" through a "transacting business" analysis in order
to subject a foreign corporate manufacturer to Colorado juris-
diction. Today, in a tort situation, "transacting business" need
151d. §§ 37-1-26(1) (a)-(c). Sections (d) and (e) subject to jurisdic-
tion any person who owns real property in the state or insures persons
or property in the state. See Zerr v. Norwood, 250 F. Supp. 1021 (D.
Colo. 1966) holding this statute constitutional. For parallel references
to the statute's model, see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1969).
16 Although some writers have made an academic distinction between the
meaning of "transacting business" and "doing business," this author
will treat them synonymously because the courts, regardless of any
possible legislative intent, interpret these phrases identically.
17 Colorado Builder's Supply Co. v. Hinman Bros. Constr. Co., 134 Colo
383, 389, 304 P.2d 892, 895 (1956) (emphasis added).
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only supplement the tortious act and possibly need not be
proven at all.
a. Prior to the 1965 Act
A leading example of the Colorado approach to tort cases
prior to the long arm statute is Focht v. Southwestern Sky-
ways, Inc.18 The injured plaintiff was attempting to join the
foreign corporate manufacturer (X) as a third party defendant
with the local seller (Y). The court, in analyzing the facts,
noted that X was a Kansas corporation whose business was
the production and sale of aircraft. X claimed to have no
control over Y, and pointed out that delivery of any order
made through Y was completed in Kansas. The aircraft was
then flown by Y from Kansas to Colorado. X argued that title
to the plane passed in Kansas, and there was no agency rela-
tionship binding X to Y nor connecting X to Colorado.
In a representative survey of the facts, the federal dis-
trict court analyzed the distributor agreement between X and
Y to determine X's contacts in Colorado and found:
1. Y was required to have all eight of X's models on hand.
2. Y was required to purchase and maintain sales promo-
tion supplies and participate in promotional efforts.
3. Y was required to follow X's ordering procedures and
to use X's forms.
4. All payment plans had to be approved by X.
5. Y was required to maintain service departments and
absorb the cost of X's warranties.
6. Y was required to purchase its tools from X.
7. X had an interest in the capital structure of Y.
8. Y's accounting system was prescribed by X and their
records were subject to review by X.
9. Reports were due from Y to X.
10. X had a factory school in Kansas where Y was "en-
couraged" to send at least one person per year.
It is impossible to discern which of these factors are most
important for determining "doing business." The point is simply
that the court will look to every possible relationship to assess
the substantiality of the contacts. But, as the court noted, "it
is not merely a matter of the frequency of the contacts, it is
also the extent of the control that a corporation exerts in a
state by means of devices such as the distributor agreement
18 220 F. Supp. 441 (D. Colo. 1963), aff'd, 336 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1964).
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. . . referred to"'19 which will determine the status of "doing
business." The court found an agency relationship, and con-
cluded that X could be subjected to service of process and in
personam jurisdiction in Colorado.2 0 The decision was based on
the quality as well as the quantity of the contacts.
b. After the 1965 Act
A case illustrative of the transition from "transacting busi-
ness" to "tortious act" is Lichina v. Futura, Inc.2 1 As in Focht,
this case involved an injury occurring within Colorado as the
result of a negligent act in manufacturing performed outside
the state. The plaintiff- attempting to utilize the new long
arm statute--argued that the "tortious act" arose within the
state. The federal district court, through a literal interpreta-
tion of the Act, held that the tortious act itself, i.e., the manu-
facturing, had to occur within the state for the plaintiff to
obtain jurisdiction over the foreign corporate manufacturer.
Being reluctant to fully implement the uninterpreted Act,
the federal court felt more comfortable with a "doing busi-
ness" analysis similar to that found in Focht. The court noted
that:
1. Salesmen of the foreign corporation had come to Colo-
rado.
2. Several sales were consummated in Colorado.
3. Several sales were sent f.o.b. Colorado.
4. The products (ski tows and lifts) were designed for
specific areas in Colorado.
5. After installation in the state, these instrumentalities
were inspected by the foreign corporation.
6. The foreign corporation took a chattel mortgage on
the lifts and tows and thereby kept a continuing interest in
the equipment.
The total effect of these contacts satisfied the court that,
under a Hanson v. Denckla analysis, the foreign corporation
was enjoying the benefits and protections of Colorado law. This,
when combined with the nature of the contact, one involving
the public safety due to the use of the equipment, compelled
the court to find that the corporation was "doing business"
in Colorado. In this fashion, they avoided the use of the new
"tortious act" provision.
19 Id. at443 (emphasis added).
20For other examples of the agency relationship for "doing business" for
tort see Jones v. Wood, 208 F. Supp. 750 (D. Colo. 1962) and White-
Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491, 418 P.2d 527 (1966).
21 260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 1966).
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"Doing business," like all conflict questions, must even-
tually be resolved by application of state law.22 Therefore, the
state courts' interpretations are of greatest significance. The
Colorado Supreme Court, when faced with a tort situation
similar to that found in Lichina, was not as reluctant as the
federal court to utilize the "tortioui act" provision of section
37-1-26(1) (c). In Vandermee v. District Court,23 the court di-
rectly confronted the question of whether the new act applied
to a nonresident corporation which designed and manufactured
an instrumentality outside of Colorado which, because of its
defective design, caused injury to a Colorado resident within
his state.
In analyzing section 37-1-26, the court found the intent of
the Colorado Legislature to be "the expansion of our court's
jurisdiction within constitutional limitations in order to provide
a local forum for Colorado residents who suffer damages in
Colorado as a result of tortious acts of non-residents." 24 The
court concluded that the "act" had its situs in Colorado where
the instrumentality failed and injured the plaintiff. The due
process limitation was considered to be satisfied because the
corporation manufactured its product with the intent to sell it
for ultimate use in another state. To secure their argument,
the court combined the "tortious act" test with a "minimum
contacts" analysis, finding that the corporation had "set up
channels of sales promotion and distribution in Colorado for
the purpose of selling its products in Colorado.
25
This liberal interpretation of the "tortious act" provision,
holding the place where the injury occurred to be the situs
of the "act," has been recently reaffirmed by the court in
Czarnick v. District Court.2 6 Here, the court followed the Illinois
precedent of Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp.,27 a case explicitly rejected by the federal court in
Lichina. The Gray case was viewed as persuasive precedent
since it interpreted the Illinois long arm statute which Colorado
used as its model. The supreme court in Czarnick referred to
the "ultimate use" test of Gray which had been used in Van-
dermee:
As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its prod-
ucts for ultimate use in another State, it is not unjust to hold it
22 Litvak Meat Co. v. Baker, 446 F.2d 329, 332 (10th Cir. 1971).
23 164 Colo. 117. 433 P.2d 335 (1967).
24 Id. at 121, 433 P.2d at 337.
25 Id. at 124, 433 P.2d at 338.
26488 P.2d 562 (Colo. 1971).
2722 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E. 2d 761 (1961).
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answerable there for any damage caused by defects in those
products.
28
The most recent case in this area illustrates the limits
of the "ultimate use" test. In Granite States Volkswagen, Inc.
v. District Court,29 the situation involved a plaintiff who pur-
chased a car in New Hampshire, and drove it to Colorado where
he was injured. Alleging injury as a result of faulty manu-
facturing, the plaintiff, a resident of Colorado, attempted to gain
jurisdiction over the manufacturer and the New Hampshire
dealer.
The New Hampshire dealer, after being personally served
in his state, moved to have the service quashed, denying any
agent, property, or contacts within Colorado. The supreme
court, in supporting the dealer's position, took notice of sec-
tion 37-1-26(1) (c) and the Vandermee and Czarnick holdings.
The court differentiated this situation from the earlier cases
in which "the defendant-manufacturer availed itself of the
channels of interstate commerce, and its product was distributed
for ultimate use in numerous states."3 ' In contrast, the dealer
in Granite was strictly in business in New Hampshire and had
no authority to sell or ship beyond that state. The fact that
the instrumentality was mobile was held not sufficient to
alter the situation.
Looking to Hanson v. Denckla, the court noted that "the
defendant must have taken voluntary action calculated to have
an effect in the forum state. '31 The fact that the injured buyer
had informed the dealer, at the time of sale, that she intended
to use the car in another state was considered insufficient
to change the local character of the business. Since the dealer
did not solicit interstate business or use channels of interstate
commerce to sell the automobiles, due process prevented the
subjection of the defendant to Colorado's jurisdiction.
c. Summary
In a tort action where the injury occurs in Colorado and
the plaintiff attempts to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign
corporate dealer or manufacturer, "doing business" and "tor-
tious act" are the two tests the court will use in analyzing the
issue. On any particular occasion, the court may choose to
emphasize one test as opposed to another. Both satisfy the
28 488 P.2d at 563, quoting Gray (emphasis added).
29 492 P.2d 624 (Colo. 1972).
30 Id. at 625.
31 Id. at 625-26.
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due process test of "minimum contacts" found in International
Shoe.
In view of its judicial acceptance and liberal interpreta-
tion, the "tortious act" provision of the new 1965 long arm
statute appears to be the simplest test to apply. The older
"doing business" test involved problems of quantitative and
qualitative analysis resulting in a highly unpredictable balanc-
ing of facts. In contrast, the "tortious act" test has developed
into a simplified question of "ultimate use." All that need
be proven is that the foreign corporation availed itself of the
channels of interstate commerce in order that its product be
ultimately used in other states. But, if the foreign corporation
can show that its business is a local one, purely intrastate in
character, then due process safeguards, as expressed in the
Granite case, will prevent the exercise of Colorado jurisdiction.
2. Contract
In the area of contract, there has been little change in
the statutory law in recent years.32 Consequently, the test for
"transacting business" is the same today as before the 1965
amendment. The one subtle but important addition to the law
is the introductory phrase, "concerning any cause of action
arising from" the transacting of business, found in section
37-1-26(1). This key language will be examined in cases dis-
cussed below.
Basically, the Colorado courts use a listing of contacts test
identical to the pre-1965 tort cases in an attempt to satisfy the
requirements of International Shoe and Hanson v. Denckla. Con-
sequently, the best analytical approach is to outline the con-
tacts considered important by the courts and attempt to gen-
eralize a conclusion from these facts.
a. Manufacturer-Distributor
In Colorado Builder's Supply Co. v. Hinman Bros. Construc-
tion Co.,33 the dealer was suing for the unpaid balance on a
purchase. As often happens, the buyer counterclaimed against
the dealer and the manufacturer for breach of warranty. In
deciding whether the foreign corporate manufacturer was sub-
ject to in personam jurisdiction in Colorado, the court fac-
tually dissected the relationship between the local dealer and
the foreign corporation (X) finding:
32 Note the "transacting business" requirement in COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31-35-19(3) (Supp. 1960), 31-9-19(3) (1963), 31-9-19(3)(a), 37-
1-26(1) (b) (Supp. 1965).
33 134 Colo. 383, 304 P.2d 892 (1956).
VOL. 49
"DOING BUSINESS" IN COLORADO
1. X did not sell directly to the public any of the equip-
ment it manufactured.
2. The relationship between X and its distributors was
purely contractual.
3. X had its plants in Georgia and Illinois.
4. All sales were completed at these plants.
5. Title to the equipment was transferred to the distribu-
tor at the time the invoice was made.
6. X employed district representatives and service engi-
neers.
Since service was made on an engineer, the court ana-
lyzed his, and therefore X's, relationship with Colorado. The
engineer was a representative for a five-state region, and his
only duties were to advise and counsel the distributors "in the
promotion of sales. '34 After each of his promotional trips, he
reported to X on the progress being made in merchandising
their product. Other facts considered by the court were: the
engineer had no authority to sell X's product; although he lived
in Denver, he spent only 5 to 8 percent of his working time
there; he had no office in Colorado; and, he was paid by salary
without commission.
The conclusion reached by the court was that X was not
"doing business" in Colorado for purposes of service of process
and in personam jurisdiction. The facts considered in reaching
this decision typify the concern of the court with the relation-
ship between a foreign corporation and: (1) the ultimate buyer,
(2) the distributor, (3) the state in general, (4) the person
served, and (5) the relation between the person served and
the state. Primarily, the court was searching for an agency
relationship through Which the foreign corporation could bind
Colorado residents to contracts. In this respect, the key fact in
Colorado Builder's was the engineer's inability to bind anyone
to a contract with X. The other important consideration was
the relationship between the manufacturer and the distributor.
Unlike Focht, the facts in Colorado Builder's were insufficient
to support a finding of an agency relationship.
Several rules adopted by the court in Colorado Builder's
are worth noting. First, it supported the holding of Louisville
& Nashville Railroad Co. v. Chatters35 by stating that:
[A] greater quantum of "doing business" within the state of the
forum is essential to jurisdiction where the claim asserted does
34 Id. at 386, 304 P.2d at 894.
35 279 U.S. 320 (1929).
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not arise out of corporate activities within that state, than would
be required in a claim arising out of corporate conduct within
the state.6
This test may not be valid today. The 1965 amendment limits
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation transacting business to
a "cause of action arising from '37 such transaction. Colorado
Builder's implies that, if the "arising from" test is not met, a
higher quantum of evidence is necessary to satisfy due process.
The 1965 Act, in contrast, can be argued to stand for the rule
that the action must arise from the transaction of business or
jurisdiction will not attach.
A second holding in Colorado Builder's worth comment is
the quotation from Colorado Iron-Works v. Sierra Grande Mining
Co.: 38
In order to invoke the aid of our own courts in the collection of
such debt, it is not necessary for a citizen of this state to show
that the debtor was doing business generally in this state, but
that he is a debtor; that the debt is due and payable here; and
the debtor, whether a natural or an artificial person, if brought
by process within the jurisdiction, is amenable to our courts.
39
This holding narrows the defenses of a foreign corporation
by stating that a debt, while not necessarily equal to "doing
business," is sufficient to subject a foreign corporation to juris-
diction. The most important requirement is that the debt of
the corporation be due and payable in Colorado.
Thus, Colorado Builder's exemplifies a multi-step process
of determining "doing business." Every fact which might es-
tablish a relationship between the corporation and the state will
be considered both quantitatively and qualitatively, individually
and in sum. Note also, if the buyer had been suing in tort under
the modern statute, the foreign corporation would have been
subjected to Colorado jurisdiction because of his negligent




Another type of situation involving foreign corporations is
where a salesman-employee sues X corporation for unpaid com-
missions. This situation arose in Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett &
Co. v. District Court41 where the employment contract was made
36 134 Colo. at 390, 304 P.2d at 896.
37 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-26(1) (b) (Supp. 1965).
38 15 Colo. 499, 25 P. 325 (1890).
39 134 Colo. at 390, 304 P.2d at 896.
40 See discussion pp. 535-38 supra.
41 138 Colo. 270, 332 P.2d 208 (1958). For an identical case and holding see
American Type Founders Co., Inc. v. District Court, 154 Colo. 156, 389
P.2d 85 (1964).
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outside the state, forcing the employee to obtain local juris-
diction through a "doing business" argument. The court con-
sidered the following facts:
1. The employee-salesman showed samples of X's product
to Colorado customers.
2. Customers ordered after seeing the samples and the
catalogue.
3. The salesman wrote up the orders and sent them to X.
4. The salesman expedited the delivery.
5. The salesman assisted in the collection of delinquent
accounts.
6. The salesman solicited new accounts.
7. X sent merchandise to Colorado for display.
8. The salesman was a full-time employee of X.
9. X made $200,000 per year in Colorado.
To counter these facts, the corporation argued that, although
it had once been doing business in Colorado, its current ac-
tivities were minimal. The court recognized this defense, but
noted that the decrease in activity had occurred within the
last year and that X still maintained salesmen in the state.
The court concluded that X was "doing business" in Colorado
and was properly subject to in personam jurisdiction.
A supplement to the above-listed contacts can be found in
Elliott v. Edwards Engineering Corp.42 where a salsman-em-
ployee's activities were again analyzed. The court considered
the following facts to be relevant: the relationship between
the employee and the foreign corporation (X), the listing of X
in a Colorado phone book, the quantity of business done by X
through its employee, and whether the action arose from deal-
ings in the state. The court granted a motion to quash service
of process because of a lack of contact between X and Colo-
rado.
c. Parent-Subsidiary
A common problem in the area of contract is the parent-
subsidiary relationship. As in other contract situations, the
facts always dictate the result. However, the Colorado courts
have established certain definite exceptions to protect a parent
from being characterized as "doing business" simply because it
has a subsidiary in the state. The supreme court has held:




[T]he mere presence in Colorado of [a] wholly owned subsidi-
ary, standing alone, does not in and of itself subject the absent
parent corporation to our state's jurisdiction, where the two
companies are operated as distinct entities .... 43
This holding was reaffirmed in Perlman v. Great States Life
Insurance Co.44 which states:
[W]here the parent and its subsidiary maintain separate identi-
ties and charge each other for services performed . . . the corpo-
rations will be treated as separate entities for the purpose of
determining personal jurisdiction.45
Although this rule appears to be predictable on its face,
the court in Perlman examined certain contacts between the
parent and the subsidiary and concluded that these two enti-
ties need not be as separate as the above-quoted language seems
to imply. First of all, "loans to a corporate subsidiary . . . do
not constitute doing business, nor would the purchase of serv-
ices from such entities."4 Most importantly, "[n]either does
stock ownership in a domestic company nor common directors,
establish that [the parent] was doing business in Colorado. ' 47
This holding appears to interpret liberally "separate entity"
for "doing business" purposes. In general, the test used by
courts in determining when the parent of a subsidiary located
in Colorado will be subject to in personam jurisdiction is simi-
lar to the test used for determing when the corporate veil will
be pierced in general corporate liability suits.
d. Advertising
An important case which analyzes the question of when
advertising will meet the "minimum contacts" test is Safari
Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court.4 Here, in an action for breach
of contract, the court restated its view that the "legislature in-
tended to extend the jurisdiction of our courts to the fullest
extent permitted by the due process clause . . ." by enacting
the 1965 statute.411 In this case the contacts were listed:
1. Foreign corporation X had advertised in three national
magazines.
2. Plaintiff-buyer, a resident of Colorado, wrote to X in
response to the advertisement.
3. X mailed brochures to plaintiff.
43 Bolger v. Dial-A-Style Leasing Corp., 159 Colo. 44, 48, 409 P.2d 517, 519
(1966).
44 164 Colo. 493, 436 P.2d 124 (1968).
45 Id. at 496-97, 436 P.2d at 125.
46 Id. at 497, 436 P.2d at 126.
47 Id. at 496, 436 P.2d at 125.
48 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783 (1969).
49 Id. at 459, 448 P.2d at 784.
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4. There was at least one interstate phone call.
5. There were 16 interstate letters.
6. $10,000 worth of checks payable to X had been drawn
by the plaintiff on a Denver bank.
The supreme court held that these contacts did not con-
stitute "doing business" because advertising was too tenuous
a contact. The court also noted that interstate phone calls and
the receipt of checks were not acts "by which the petitioner [X]
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting
activities within Colorado, thus invoking the benefits of its
laws."50
In contrast to this holding that advertising is not a suffi-
cient contact for service of process, section 138-5-2(22) (a) (c)
of the Colorado statutes defines "doing business" for taxation
purposes to include the "distribution of catalogues or other ad-
vertising" for solicitation.51 This statute will be examined as
to its constitutional validity in part three of this note.
e. "Arising From"
As mentioned earlier, an important consideration under the
new long arm statute is whether the action arose from the
transacting of business in Colorado. Although few cases have
interpreted this phrase, the issue was confronted in Knight v.
District Court.52 The plaintiff, a Colorado corporation, sued a
Utah resident on a promissory note. The defendant had come to
Colorado and had negotiated a loan with the plaintiff-bank.
Three months later, the promissory note was renegotiated in
Utah.
The court, looking to section 37-1-26 for guidance, held that
the renewal note had its "genesis" in the initial Colorado trans-
action. Because of the relationship between the two notes, the
plaintiff's claim was considered to have "arisen from" business
transacted in Colorado, and therefore the defendant was sub-
ject to Colorado's jurisdiction.
5 3
The federal court limited this opinion by holding in a later
case that if "no negotiations have been conducted in the forum
state, the minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction
50 Id. at 460-61, 448 P.2d at 785.
51 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-5-2(22) (c) (Supp. 1967).
52 162 Colo. 14, 424 P.2d 110 (1967).
53 For another promissory note case using CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-26
(Supp. 1965) see Circle A Drilling Co. v. Sheehan, 251 F. Supp. 242 (D.
Colo. 1966). See also Clinic Masters, Inc. v. McCollar, 269 F. Supp. 395
(D. Colo. 1967).
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are found wanting. '54 The simple fact that payment alone
occurred in the state will not suffice to capture the foreign
person; and "the mere existence of a contract executed by a
Colorado resident . . . is [not] sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction over an absent nonresident defendant." 55
Although little can be said at present about the phrase
"arising from," this phrase will be of paramount importance
in any action where it is necessary to establish jurisdiction
through a "doing business" test. A potential question is: What
happens to a foreign corporation which commits a tort outside
the state which was the direct result of a contract made between
the parties in Colorado? Did the tort "arise from" the transac-
tion of business in Colorado? This extension of the long arm
statute is conceivable, especially in view of part statutory con-
struction used by the courts in expanding Colorado's jurisdic-
tion. "Arising from" has the potential to become 'he judiciary's
most powerful tool in implementing this expansion.
f. Procedure
A final case worthy of note because of its procedural im-
plications is Geer Co. v. District Court.56 Here, a buyer counter-
claimed against the dealer and manufacturer in response to a
claim for nonpayment. The buyer served notice on the manu-
facturer under section 31-9-19(3) (a), serving the secretary of
state and the manufacturer by mail. Although successful at
the trial level, on appeal the plaintiff attempted to support
her jurisdictional claim by use of section 37-1-26, the long arm
statute. The supreme court reversed in favor of the manufac-
turer and refused to accept the changed plea.
Plaintiff's error was in her original complaint which alleged
that the manufacturer was doing business in Colorado "through
its agent," the dealer.57 The defendant easily defeated this
unnecessarily narrow complaint by proving that its relation-
ship with the dealer was one of purchaser-seller.
The plaintiff made two errors: one strategic, the other legal.
Strategically, she should not have limited her claims of "doing
business" to the agency factor. As previously discussed, an
agency relationship is merely one of many facts to be con-
sidered in determining whether a foreign corporation is "doing
business" in Colorado. In the face of a broader complaint, the
.4 Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996, 1000
(D. Colo. 1971).
55 Id. at 1001.
56 172 Colo. 48, 469 P.2d 734 (1970).
57 Id. at 50-51, 469 P.2d at 735.
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defendant's rebuttal of the agency relationship would not neces-
sarily have defeated the service of process, especially since
there were other contacts indicating that the manufacturer
was "doing business" in the state.
The second error, legal in nature, was the attempted change
in plea on appeal. Since service was by mail, the plaintiff
was barred from using the long arm statute, which requires
personal service. The move to alter the plea illustrates plain-
tiff's lack of understanding of the difference between the stat-
utes. It is not required that agency be proven under one and
not the other. The test for both laws is transacting business.
The error was in the original complaint, not in choice of statute.
The conclusion is a caveat: since "[t]he burden of proof
is on the . . . plaintiff to establish by competent evidence all
the facts essential to the court's jurisdiction,"5 8 there is no
reason to increase this burden by drafting an overly specific
complaint. The statutes require that "transacting business" be
proven to subject a foreign corporation to service of process
and jurisdiction. Therefore, this is all that need be pleaded in
such a case.
g. Summary
The following questions should be asked when determining
a foreign corporation's status for service of process in Colorado
for all nontortious cases. The answers to these questions may
establish facts which either alone or in combination may con-
stitute "doing business":
1. Does foreign corporation X sell directly to the public
in Colorado?
2. If it does, where are the sales completed?
3. How is delivery effectuated?
4. Is the instrumentality sent f.o.b. Colorado?
5. Does X maintain a security interest in the instrumen-
tality?
6. If X does not sell directly, what is the relationship
between X and its distributors?
7. What is the relationship between X and its salesmen?
8. What is the relationship between X and its employees
in Colorado?
9. What authority do the distributors, salesmen, and em-
ployees have to bind X contractually?
10. What are the duties of the distributors, salesmen, and
58 Id. at 52, 469 P.2d at 736.
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employees in Colorado?
11. For how much territory are the distributors, salesmen,
and employees responsible?
12. Do the distributors, salesmen, and employees live in
Colorado?
13. Is X listed in a state phone book, either independently
or concurrently with its employee, salesman, or distributor?
14. What is the quality of business done by X in Colorado?
15. What is the quantity of business done by X in Colorado?
16. Does X have a debt due and payable in Colorado?
17. If X has a subsidiary in Colorado, what is their re-
lationship?
18. Do X and the subsidiary have common directors?
19. Does X control the subsidiary's stock?
20. Do X and the subsidiary charge each other for services
performed?
21. Is X's only contact in Colorado through advertising?
22. If the solicitation is successful, how is the sale made?
23. Does X negotiate contracts in Colorado?
24. Are the contracts merely payable in Colorado?
25. Does a cause of action arise from any of the above
transactions of business?
II. QUALFCATION
According to the Colorado Supreme Court:
[T]here is a distinction between "doing business" by a foreign
corporation such as would subject it to the jurisdiction of courts
not of its domicile, and "doing business" of the character that
would subject it to the power of the state to impose regulations
upon its activities. 5 9
This position is further supported by Professor Leflar who
feels that "more activity is required to subject a corporation
to the penalties of a qualification statute than to subject the
corporation to taxation on its local business or to service of
process on unauthorized agents."60
Few qualification cases have appeared in Colorado in the
last 50 years. This sparsity is partly due to the heavier burden
of proof necessary to establish "doing business" for qualifica-
5 9 Begole Aircraft Supplies, Inc. v. Pacific Airmotive Corp., 121 Colo. 88,
89-90, 212 P.2d 860, 861 (1949).
60R. LEFLAR, AMSuCAN CONFLICTS LAw 615 (1968).
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tion purposes. More importantly, the penalty in Colorado for
failure to qualify is too minimal to encourage litigation.61
A. Constitutional Premise
As with service of process and taxation, there are certain
basic constitutional maxims which override the area of qualify-
ing to do business in a state. Although due process and equal
protection are potential constitutional restrictions, the key issue
in qualification is: Does the state statute interfere with the
free flow of interstate commerce and thereby place an undue
burden on that commerce?
As a basic premise, it has been held that "the Commerce
Clause does not cut the States off from all legislative relation
to foreign and interstate commerce. '62 Furthermore, requiring
that a corporation obtain a certificate to do business "is a con-
ventional means of assuring responsibility and fair dealing on
the part of foreign corporations coming into a State . . . . In
short, it is a supervisory and not a fiscal measure.
'63
These theories are based on the constitutional philosophy
that a state can protect "the health, safety, morals and welfare
of its people" even though its restrictions affect interstate com-
merce "incidentally" or "indirectly." 4 In sum, the issues which
all courts must analyze in qualification cases are: (1) What
is the nature of the commerce? (2) Would a qualification re-
quirement place an undue burden on that commerce?
The most recent expression by the United States Supreme
Court on these issues is Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-on-Drugs, Inc.,
6 5
a decision which split the Court 4-1-4. The parties in the suit
were both corporations, one from Indiana, the other from New
Jersey. The former wished to enjoin the latter from selling its
goods at prices below the minimum set in a retail contract
which was executed by the parties in New Jersey. The de-
fendant argued that, under New Jersey law,66 only foreign
corporations qualified to transact business in the state are
allowed to bring any action there on a contract. In response,
the foreign corporate plaintiff alleged that its business in New
61 See generally Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137
(1955); Note, Corporations- State Regulation of Foreign Corporations
-Interstate v. Intrastate Business, 19 ALA. L. REV. 193 (1966); Note,
The Entry and Regulation of Foreign Corporations Under New Mexico
Law and Under the Model Business Corporation Act, 6 NAT. RES. J. 617
(1966).
62 Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 209 (1944).
63 Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
64 Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 201 (1944).
65 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
66 N.J. REV. STAT. § 14:15-3 to -4 (1937).
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Jersey was entirely in interstate commerce, and therefore, the
filing requirement violated the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court upheld New Jersey's statute and the
position of the defendant by characterizing the plaintiff's ac-
tivities as both interstate and intrastate. The Court noted that
"[i]t is well established that New Jersey cannot require
[the Indiana corporation] to get a certificate of authority to
do business in the State if its participation in this trade is
limited to its wholly interstate sales to New Jersey whole-
salers." 67 On the other hand, the Court held that "it is equally
well settled that if [the Indiana corporation] is engaged in
intrastate as well as interstate aspects of the New Jersey drug
business, the State can require it to get a certificate of au-
thority to do business.
'68
Following these premises, the Court analyzed the facts
and noted that the plaintiff hired a number of persons who
lived and worked in New Jersey, had an office in New Jersey,
was listed in a state phone book, and paid its New Jersey
secretary by salary. The fact that the litigation was based on
the interstate aspects of plaintiff's business was held immaterial,
and the defendant's position was upheld.
Justice Douglas, in dissent, argued that the plaintiff's em-
ployees were equal to "drummers" and he compared the case
to Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District.69 Unlike the ma-
jority, he did not want to separate these activities from plain-
tiff's interstate business because "[h]ere the dominant activity
is nothing more than advertising and public relations. These
are the minimum activities in which every 'drummer' for
an out-of-state concern engaged. '7 0 Therefore, he considered
such activities to be "exclusively in furtherance of interstate
commerce."
'71
Although this case has been cited as holding that a state
is precluded "from exacting a license of a firm doing an ex-
clusively interstate business as a condition of entry in the
67 366 U.S. at 278 (emphasis added). The Court cited Robbins v. Shelby
County Tax. Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887), Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S.
47 (1891), International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910), and
Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914).
68 Id. at 279. The Court cited Railway Express v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440
(1931) and Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944).
69 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
70 366 U.S. at 292.
71 Id. at 291, quoting Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minne-
sota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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State, -7 2 it has also been interpreted in a more liberal fashion.7 3
For this note, the importance of the case is its typification of
the issues considered, and the problems they create, in an ex-
ample qualification case. As with service of process and taxa-
tion, the conclusion is ultimately one of fact, a test which gives
rise to 4-1-4 opinions like Lilly.
7 4
B. Colorado Statutory Law
The basic law in Colorado on qualification is section 31-9-
1 (1) which states: "No foreign corporation shall have the right
to transact business in this state until it shall have procured
a certificate of authority so to do from the secretary of state. '7 5
If a foreign corporation complies with the procedures,
7 6 it will
"enjoy the same, but no greater, rights and privileges as a
domestic corporation .... -77
Most foreign corporations are concerned with the penalties
for failure to file. In Colorado, the primary sanction is that
the corporation shall not be permitted "to maintain any action,
suit or proceeding in any court of this state, until such cor-
poration shall have obtained a certificate of authority. 7 8 This
prohibition, which simply abates the action, will be discussed
later. This penalty is supplemented by section 31-9-3(3) which
holds the unauthorized corporation liable "in an amount equal
to all fees which would have been imposed by this code upon
such corporation had it duly applied for and received a cer-
tificate of authority to transact business in this state as re-
quired . . . .7
The laxity of these penalties is emphasized by section 31-
9-3(2) which states that the failure of a foreign corporation
to obtain a certificate "shall not impair the validity of any
contract or act of such corporation, and shall not prevent
such corporation from defending any action, suit or proceeding
72 Justice Douglas' dissent to the Court's dismissal of the appeal of People
v. Fairfax Family Fund, Inc., 235 Cal. App. 2d 881, 47 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1964), in Fairfax Family Fund, Inc. v. California, 382 U.S. 1, 2 (1965).
73 See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. T.G. Stores, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 941 (D.
Md. 1965), aff'd, 356 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1966).
74 Note that for interstate carriers there are different issues which will not
be discussed in this paper. See Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Equity
Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
7 5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1(1) (1963).
76 Every foreign ccrporation authorized to do business in Colorado must:
(1) have a registered office and (2) have a registered agent for service
of process. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-9-17 (1963), 31-9-18 (Supp.
1965).
7 Id. § 31-9-4 (1963).




in any court of this state."8 0 This laxity has resulted in a limited
amount of litigation in Colorado on the issue.81 The remainder
of the statute itemizes the formal procedures involved,8 2 yet
nowhere in the act is the term "transacting business" defined. 13
C. Colorado Case Law
Since a definition of "transacting business" is unavailable
at the statutory level, it is necessary to look to the common law
for guidance. Unfortunately, very few qualification cases have
been litigated in Colorado in the last 50 years. However, cases
from the 19th and early 20th centuries, even though based on
different statutory requirements, can provide basic premises
which remain valid. The reliance of the Supreme Court upon
old precedent in Lilly demonstrates the relevance of past cases.
There is an abundance of Colorado cases during this early
period due to the stiff penalties then imposed by the qualifi-
cation statutes. Instead of merely preventing an unqualified
corporation from suing until it filed a certificate, the law held
all officers, agents, stockholders, and directors personally liable
for anything that occurred while unqualified. Furthermore,




a. One Act v. Continuous Transaction
For service of process, McGee8 5 held one contract to be
a sufficient contact for "doing business" in a foreign state.
This test is not valid for qualification purposes.
In 1913, the Colorado Court of Appeals faced this issue
so Id. § 31-9-3 (2).
81 Note in contrast the strict sanctions imposed by other states for failure
to qualify. See Note, Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Corporate
Qualification Statutes, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 117 (1963).
8
2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-9-5 (1963) -corporate name (form F-2),
31-9-6 (1963) -change of name (form F-3), 31-9-7 (Supp. 1965) -
what application must contain, 31-9-8 (1963) -how to file, 31-9-9
(1963) - purpose stated in application, 31-9-10 (1963) - amendment
to corporation's articles (form F-4), 31-9-11 (Supp. 1967) -amend-
ment to certificate (form F-3), 31-9-12 (Supp. 1967) -revocation of
certificate by the secretary of state, 31-9-13 (1963) - issuance of
certificate of revocation, 31-9-14 (1963) -filing of articles of merger,
31-9-15 (Supp. 1967) -withdrawal (form F-5), 31-9-16 (1963) -filing
of certificate of withdrawal, 31-9-17 (1963) -registered office and
agent, 31-9-18 (Supp. 1965) -change of registered office or agent.
83For examples of definitions of "doing business" for qualification see
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 106 (1971) and RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 311 (1971).
84See Ch. 19, § 23, [1877] Colo. Sess. Laws 151 (General Laws of Colo-
rado); Ch. 52, §§ 1-14, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 116. For a case on officer
liability see King Copper Co. v. Dreher, 68 Colo. 554, 191 P. 98 (1920).
85 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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in Cockburn v. Kinsley.s8 There, a foreign corporation, which had
made a contract in the state, denied "doing business" in Colo-
rado. The court noted that the purpose of the then-existent
qualification statute 7 was to require filing by foreign cor-
porations which were "engaging in the general prosecution and
operation of the ordinary business which they were incor-
porated to carry on . . . in order that the state authorities
may supervise and control their transactions . *..."88 There-
fore, the court felt that "a single act or business transaction is
not 'doing business' within the meaning of the [qualification]
statute .... "-89
The court made a distinction between "doing business" for
service of process and "doing business" for qualification, and
held that "cases involving motions to quash the service upon
a foreign corporation are not controlling in cases such as the
present one." 90 However, the court noted that, if it can be
proven that a corporation is not "doing business" for service
of process, it definitely is not "doing business" for qualification
"because an inconsiderable transaction of business ought to be
sufficient in the former instance that would not be at all suf-
ficient in the latter."91
Another important case on this issue of continuous con-
tacts is Cooper Manufacturing Co. v. Ferguson92 where the
plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, had made a contract with a
citizen of Colorado. The defendant breached the contract; but
the plaintiff, when suing for damages, was confronted with
the defense that it had failed to file a certificate, thereby
making the contract invalid under the current law.
9 3
The United States Supreme Court held that, because the
contract was the only business ever conducted by the corpora-
tion in Colorado, it was not "doing business" for qualifica-
tion purposes. The Court further stated that a foreign cor-
poration must ordinarily transact business to be subject to a
qualification statute, although the "extent of exercise of these
powers" was left undecided. 94 In contrast to the modem McGee
doctrine for service of process, the Court held that the "prohi-
88 25 Colo. App. 89, 135 P. 1112 (1913).
87 Ch. 52, §§ 1-14, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 116.
88 25 Colo. App. at 109, 135 P. at 1118.
89 Id. at 100, 135 P. at 1116.
90 Id. at 103, 135 P. at 1117.
91 Id.
92 113 U.S. 727 (1885).
93 Ch. 19, § 23, [1877] Colo. Sess. Laws 151 (General Laws of Colorado).
94 113 U.S. at 734 (emphasis by the court).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
bition against doing any business cannot . . . be literally in-
terpreted,"95 and that the Colorado constitution" did not refer
to a single act but rather to the "carrying on of business by
a foreign corporation." 9 Since this section of the state's con-
stitution has yet to be amended, this interpretation is valid
today.
b. Interstate v. Intrastate Commerce
Another case relevant to a substantive interpretation of
the current statutes is Butler Brothers Shoe Co. v. United States
Rubber Co.98 There, the defendant, a Colorado corporation, had
contracted with a New Jersey corporation to sell goods, retain-
ing certain funds in a Colorado account for the plaintiff-foreign
corporation. When the defendant defaulted in payments and
the plaintiff sued, the defendant alleged that the New Jersey
corporation was not licensed to do business in Colorado, and,
therefore, the contract was void. ')9 Citing Cooper, the defendant
argued that a foreign corporation "cannot lawfully exercise
any corporate power or do any business whatever in the State
of Colorado without compliance with the requirements of its
statutes."'100
The court, in disagreeing with the defendant, noted that
all corporations have the right to "institute and maintain in
the federal courts . . . its suits in every other state ... ,
More importantly, the contracts between the two parties were
considered to be interstate in nature. The Colorado law was
held to be "ineffectual to restrain or modify the power or
duty of the national courts to hear and decide the contro-
versies of such corporations arising from its [sic] transactions of
interstate commerce . ".1..2
c. Summary
Article 15, section 10, of the Colorado constitution has been
11I1d.
"; COLO. CONST. art. 15, § 10 (1876) provides: "No foreign corporation shall
do any business in this State without having one or more known places
of business, and an authorized agent or agents in the same, upon whom
process may be served."
117 113 U.S. at 734 (emphasis added). Colorado cases supporting this in-
terpretation of doing business as a continuous act for qualification are:
Craig v. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co., 38 Colo. 115, 87 P. 1143 (1906);
Roseberry v. Valley Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 35 Colo. 132, 83 P. 637 (1905);
Miller v. Williams, 27 Colo. 34, 59 P. 740 (1899); Kindel v. Beck & Pauli
Lithographing Co., 19 Colo. 310, 35 P. 538 (1893); Tabor v. Goss &
Phillips Mfg. Co., 11 Colo. 419, 18 P. 537 (1888); Gates Iron Works v.
Cohen, 7 Colo. App. 341, 43 P. 667 (1890).
8156 F. 1 (8th Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 577 (1908).
99 Ch. 52, § 10, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 121.
100 156 F. at 6-7. Defendant cited COLO. CONST. art. 15, § 10 (1876).
101 Id. at 16.
102 Id. at 18.
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interpreted to be limited to the carrying on of business in intra-
state commerce. This interpretation, which limits the applica-
tion of the qualification laws to foreign corporations which
commit more than a single act or which are not engaged solely
in interstate comerce, has been supported by case law.'" ' Thus,
the simple conclusion is that "doing business" for qualification
purposes is a stricter test requiring more contacts than the test
for service of process. Even if a series of contacts is proven,
the corporation may still maintain the defense of interstate




The heavier burden of proof and the current minimal
penalty for failure to qualify are not the only factors in-
hibiting the litigation of "doing business" for qualification.
Along with these is the characterization of the statute as a
mere abatement. As noted earlier, if a corporation fails to quali-
fy, it cannot bring a suit in the state until a certificate of
authority is obtained. Even in 1907, it was permissible to
file the certificate after commencement of a suit and thereby
alleviate the problem.' 4 This procedural maneuver, which even-
tually eliminated the issue of qualification, was accepted by
the Colorado Supreme Court in 1928 when it held that "En]on-
compliance with that statute is a matter in abatement."' 05
The leading and most recent case on this point is Admiral
Corp. v. Trio Television Sales & Service, Inc."'6 The case involved
a foreign corporation which brought suit, but was dismissed
from court because it was not qualified to do business in
Colorado. After judgment, the plaintiff filed his certificate and
brought a new suit on the same claim. The defendant pleaded
res judicata.
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the defendant's plea,
and held that where a foreign corporation's suit is dismissed
solely on the basis of its failure to file a certificate, mainten-
ance of the suit is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata
if such corporation files after the dismissal.10 7 As in the 1907
case, it was held that "[f]ailure to file the required certificate
103See, e.g., Savage v. Central Elec. Co., 59 Colo. 66, 148 P. 254 (1915);
Herman Bros. Co. v. Nasiacos, 46 Colo. 208, 103 P. 301 (1909).
104 Internaticnal Trust Co. v. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co., 41 Colo. 299,
92 P. 727 (1907).
105 Rocky Mt. Seed Co. v. McArthur, 85 Colo. 1, 5, 272 P. 1117, 1119 (1928).
1U6 138 Colo. 157, 330 P.2d 1106 (1958).
107 Id. at 162, 330 P.2d at 1108-09.
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served only to abate the action during the time it remained
unrecorded.' '10 8 In summary, the court stated:
The dismissal of an action based exclusively upon a defense
which could only abate the action does not in any manner
prejudice the right of the plaintiff to bring a second suit on the
same claim once the defect which gave rise to the abatement
of the first action has been cured.10 9
The result of this case is to encourage a foreign corpora-
tion to pay the filing fees and obtain a certificate rather than
face lengthy and expensive litigation on the issues of "doing
business" and interstate commerce. Furthermore, corporations
need no longer fear the pre-1920 repercussions from late filing.
b. Pleading as a Defense
Another important procedural point first noted in 1919
is that a "defendant's failure to plead noncompliance [with
the qualification statute] amounted to a waiver thereof." 0
This issue appeared more recently in Zelinger v. Uvalde Rock
Asphalt Co."' where a defendant did not raise the issue of
plaintiff's failure to qualify until the appellate level. The court
dismissed the complaint because the "failure of a foreign
corporation to comply with the cited statute goes to its ca-
pacity to sue, and is a matter of defense to be pleaded by
the defendant in bar of the action."'112 Therefore, although fail-
ure to qualify can be an effective means of abating a case, it
must be pleaded initially or the defense is waived.
c. Statute of Limitations
One final procedural point of importance is the effect of
abatement on the statute of limitations. A 1911 case which
still stands as valid precedent is Western Electrical Co. v.
Pickett.113 Here, in a fact situation similar to the Admiral case,
the court faced the question: Is the running of the statute
of limitations suspended by the attempted institution of the
suit before compliance with qualification?
The supreme court answered no, rationalizing that when
the plaintiff filed suit it technically could not prosecute be-
cause of its failure to qualify. Thus, the statute of limitations
108 Id.
109 Id. at 163, 330 P.2d at 1109. Note the interesting dissent which analyzes
the question of corporate "existence" under COLO. RV. STAT. AqNN. §
141-2-1 (2) (1953). An analysis of this statute can be found in Capriles,
Business Organization, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 613, 649 (1960).
110 Watson v. Empire Cream Separator Co., 66 Colo. 284, 285, 180 P. 685
(1919).
111 316 F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1963).
112 Id. at 53.
113 51 Colo. 415, 118 P. 988 (1911).
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ran until the filing of the certificate and the commencement
of the second suit. The court felt that to hold otherwise would
"abrogate the only inconvenience or penalty which has been
placed upon the non-resident corporation for its failure to




The substantive issues involved in qualification and "do-
ing business" appear to be mooted by the procedural doctrine
of abatement. The only penalty, that of not being able to
bring suit while not qualified, can be remedied without fear
of res judicata. The procedure has eliminated this aspect of
"doing business" from the Colorado courts since the paying
of back fees will certainly amount to less than a litigation of
the issue.
If involved in such a suit, one must be aware of two
caveats. First, the nonqualification must be pleaded as a de-
fense at the trial level; and second, the statute of limitations
will continue to run as long as the corporation is unqualified,
regardless of attempted suits in the interim. This last point
exemplifies one of the few instances in which the defense of
failure to qualify could be an effective strategy.
III. TAXATION
A. Constitutional Premise
The power of a state to tax a foreign corporation is limited
by the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
When a foreign corporation is faced with a state tax levy, its
best defense is to allege the levy places an undue burden on
interstate commerce. In deciding the merits of such a defense
in the past, the Supreme Court has considered whether the
tax was discriminatorily applied, whether it was properly
apportioned, and whether there was a sufficient nexus be-
tween the state and the corporation. As the Court has suc-
cinctly stated, "[tihe simple but controlling question is whether
the state has given anything for which it can ask return."" 5
In this note, consideration of the highly complex subject
matter of state taxation on interstate commerce is limited to
the question of "doing business." To analyze this question, the
sales and use tax, franchise tax, and income tax will be re-
viewed. Within this general scope, the constitutional premise
can be summarized as follows:
114 Id. at 424, 118 P. at 991.
115 Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
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[N]et income from the interstate operations of a foreign corpora-
tion may be subjected to state taxation provided the levy is not
discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities
within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support
the same.11 6
Below is a brief summary of questions deemed important
by the Supreme Court when analyzing state taxation of for-
eign corporations:
1. Were the sales arranged through an agent in the taxing
state?
117
2. Did the corporation maintain salesmen or solicitors in
the state?""
3. Did the corporation solicit entirely through the mail?"19
4. Did the corporation maintain local stores within the
state?
120
5. Was the taxpayer merely an "itinerant drummer"? 1 1
6. Was the tax levied on the "privilege" of engaging in
interstate commerce?
122
7. Does the tax subject the corporation to the burden of
"multiple taxation" ?12
8. Does the tax discriminate so as to provide a "direct
commercial advantage to local business"?"'
-
The answers to the above-listed questions will determine the
sufficiency of the nexus and the fairness of the tax.
B. Colorado Case Law
Whether one is susceptible to taxation for "doing business"
in Colorado is, with the exception of the franchise tax, not
dependent on the qualification issue. A "foreign corporation
may escape a state tax [income or sales and use] even though
it is qualified to do business in the state.' 125 The question of
taxation is resolved on the basis of the quality, quantity, and
116 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959). For general comments on this area, see Note, Federal Limita-
tions on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARv. L. REV. 953
(1962); Note, State Taxation of Multistate Businesses, 74 YALE L.J. 1259
(1965).
117 Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939); General Trad-
ing Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
118 Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
119 National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Rev., 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
120 Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941); Nelson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
121 Robbins v. Shelby County Tax. Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
122 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
123 J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
124 Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1945).
125 1 CCH STATE TAX REP., COLO. 2-012 (1965).
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character of the business transacted in the state plus an
analysis of the nature of the tax. Thus, it involves the same
factual analysis discussed for service of process and qualifica-
tion.
Briefly, Colorado cases have held that sales made by an
itinerant traveling salesman are not subject to a use tax on
the distribution of circulars."26 Since his business was purely
interstate, the levy violated the commerce clause. The court
has also stated that taxing a foreign corporation on sales
completed outside of the state was violative of the commerce
clause. Additionally, taxing a foreign corporation on sales
completed outside of the state was held violative of the Con-
stitution, even though the corporation had an office in the
state and was selling to Colorado residents. 127 In contrast, a
corporation which held no property in Colorado, had never
engaged in business in the state, had no office of solicitation,
and had never carried on commerce in Colorado, was held
liable for income tax on "income received from a source in
Colorado. ' '128 It has also been held that a foreign nonprofit
corporation is not entitled to an income tax exemption unless
it operates in Colorado "for the benefit of the people of this
State."1
29
Colorado case law in the area of taxation is quite old.
The cases, standing alone, are too broad to support a detailed
analysis, although a few premises can be gleaned from them.
To find definitive aid on taxation questions, one must look
to the statutes where, for the first time, there appears an ex-
plicit definition of "doing business."
C. Colorado Statutory Law
1. Sales and Use Tax
In the definition section of the Colorado sales and use
tax statute,130 the phrase "doing business" is defined. Al-
though this definition has yet to be interpreted by the Colorado
Supreme Court, it appears that the statute is subject to a valid
constitutional challenge.
First, the definition characterizes the leasing, selling, or
delivering of tangible personal property by a retail sale for
126 City of Pueblo v. Lukins, 63 Colo. 197, 164 P. 1164 (1917).
127 Colorado v. American Can Co., 117 Colo. 312, 186 P.2d 779 (1947). Note:
the defendant was authorized to do business in Colorado.
128 Arvey Corp. v. Fugate, 129 Colo. 595, 272 P.2d 652, cert. denied, 348 U.S.
871 (1954).




COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 138-5-2(22) (Supp. 1967).
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the use, storage, distribution, or consumption within Colorado
as "doing business" for the purpose of the statute.13 ' Second,
a foreign corporation is "doing business" for the purpose of
the statute if it maintains in the state, either directly or through
its subsidiary, an office, distributing house, salesroom, ware-
house, or other place of business. 3 2 The third and final section
will be quoted in its entirety because of the apparent con-
stitutional flaw. "Doing business" is:
The soliciting, either by direct representative, indirect repre-
sentatives, manufacturers' agents, or by distribution of catalogues
or other advertising, or by use of any communication media, or
by use of the newspaper, radio, or television advertising media,
or by any other means whatsoever, of business from persons
residing in this state, and by reason thereof receiving orders
from, or selling or leasing tangible personal property to, such
persons residing in this state for use, consumption, distribution,
and storage for use or consumption in this state.133
This statute, in its detailed analysis of the phrase "doing
business," is a marked improvement over the nondefined areas
of service of process and qualification. Unfortunately, the above-
quoted section sharply conflicts with a 1967 Supreme Court
opinion on taxation in interstate commerce.
In National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,34
the Supreme Court confronted the issue of a sales and use tax
levied on solicitations made through catalogues. The foreign
corporation involved was a Missouri mail order house which
sent catalogues twice a year to active or recent customers in
Illinois. "Flyers" were also mailed to potential customers in
the state. The corporation had no place of business in Illinois,
no agents or solicitors in the state, no telephone listing there,
and conducted no advertising by means of billboards, radio,
or television. The State of Illinois attempted to levy a use tax
on the corporation by making it collect and pay taxes on sales
made in the state.
The Supreme Court, in ruling against the state, held that
the Constitution requires "some definite link, some minimum
connection between a state and the person, property or trans-
action it seeks to tax.'13 5 The Court was particularly con-
cerned with whether National Bellas Hess had been afforded
131 Id. § 138-5-2(22) (a).
132 Id. § 138-5-2 (22) (b).
133 Id. § 138-5-2(22) (c) (emphasis added).
134 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
135 Id. at 756, quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45
(1954).
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"the protection and services of the taxing State."'1 6 The main
obstacle facing Illinois was the fact that "the Court has never
held that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection
and payment upon a seller whose only connection with cus-
tomers in the State is by common carrier or the United States
mail.' 1 37 When challenged, Colorado will be faced with that
same obstacle.
This distinction between mail order sellers with retail
outlets, solicitors, or property within the state and those who
communicate with their customers solely by mail or common
carrier was adamantly defended by the Court. Not only was
the contact with the state deemed tenuous, the opinion noted
that "it is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more
exclusively interstate in character than the mail order trans-
actions here involved.'
38
Obviously, the Colorado statute, which was enacted the
same year National Bellas Hess was decided, conflicts with
this holding in stating that "[t]he soliciting . . . by distribu-
tion of catalogues" 13 9 is transacting business for sales and use
tax purposes. In addition to this conflict, the Colorado Supreme
Court has held that advertising is too tenuous a contact even
for service of process.
140
Thus, the solicitation section of this definition is open to
constitutional attack because of the undue burden on inter-
state commerce and lack of contact. The remainder of the
statute appears valid, and places taxation in its usual posi-
tion as regards "doing business:" fewer contacts are necessary
for service of process, but more are necessary for qualification.
2. Franchise Tax
The current Colorado franchise or license tax,' 4 ' levied
on foreign corporations which are qualified and authorized to
do business in Colorado, is also subject to constitutional chal-
lenge. As noted earlier,142 section 31-9-4 states that any foreign
corporation which qualifies to do business in Colorado shall
"enjoy the same, but no greater, rights and privileges as a
domestic corporation.' 1 43 However, there is currently a dis-
136 Id. at 757.
137 Id. at 758.
138 Id. at 759.
139 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-5-2(22) (c) (Supp. 1967).
140 Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 488 P.2d 783
(1969).
141 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-10-7 (1963).
142 See discussion p. 549 supra.
143 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-4 (1963).
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parity between the franchise tax for domestic corporations
and the license tax for foreign corporations.
Under section 31-10-6, a franchise tax on domestic corpora-
tions is itemized as follows:
A $10 tax on every corporation with an authorized capital stock
of $50,000 or less;
$20 - $50,001 to $150,000
$40 - $150,001 to $250,000
$65- $250,001 to $500,000
$100-- $500,001 to $1,000,000
$250 - over $1,000,001.141
In contrast to this graduated scale, section 31-10-7 states
that all foreign corporations who are qualified to do business
in Colorado are subject to a flat $100 license tax in lieu of
a franchise tax.1 4" This open discrimination in taxation contra-
dicts the consitutional premises which dominate this area of
the law.
In 1905, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a similar statute
which permitted discrimination between domestic and foreign
corporations on taxation of authorized capital stock.1413 The
court based its opinion on a detailed differentiation between
"excise" and "property" taxes. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court reversed and held the statute unconstitutional
as impairing the contractual relationship between the corpora-
tion and the state.1
4 7
At that time, Colorado had a statute, similar to the current
section 31-9-4, which granted a foreign corporation rights equal
to those of a domestic corporation if the foreign corporation
had qualified to do business in the state. 148 The Supreme Court
characterized this promise as being contractual: the state would
give the foreign corporation equal rights in return for formal
qualification. Because of this contract, the Court disagreed
with the Colorado Supreme Court's careful delineation of
"excise" and "property" taxes, and held:
Whatever be the name or nature of the tax, it must be measured
in amount by the same rate as is provided for the domestic in-
144 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-10-6 (1963).
145 Id. § 31-10-7.
146 American Smelting & Refining Co. v. People ex rel. Lindsley, 34 Colo.
240, 82 P. 531 (1905). The statute involved was ch. 3, §§ 64-66, [1902]
Colo. Sess. Laws 73-74 which placed a 2 cent levy on every $1000 of
capital stock for domestic corporations and a 4 cent tax on the same
amount for foreign corporations. If the foreign corporation's stock had
a par value of less than $1, the tax was 21/2 cents per $1000 of stock.
147 American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Colorado ex rel. Lindsley, 204
U.S. 103 (1907).
148 Ch. 19, § 23, [1877] Colo. Sess. Laws 151 (General Laws of Colorado).
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stitution, and if the latter is not taxed in that way neither can
the State thus tax the foreign corporation.'
4 9
In further clarifying its position, the Court noted that "[t]his
is not an exemption from taxation, it is simply a limitation of
the power to tax beyond the rate of taxation imposed upon a
domestic corporation.
150
Since this case is still recognized as valid law, it would
appear that the franchise tax in Colorado is subject to attack
on the ground that it impairs the obligation of the contract
existing between the state and a qualified foreign corporation
under section 31-9-4. As the Court said in American Smelting:
[T]he liabilities, restrictions and duties imposed upon domestic
corporations constitute tie measure and "imit of the liabilities,
retrictions and duties which might thereafter be imposed upon
the corporation thus admitted to do business in the State.1
5 1
This equilibrium is not expressed in sections 31-10-6 and -7,
and should be challenged by any foreign corporation subjected
to the $100 levy or any domestic corporation now paying over
$100 in franchise taxes.
3. Income Tax
a. Prior to 1951
Prior to 1951, the Colorado income tax law governing cor-
porations required a 4 percent levy on "the entire net income
derived from property located and business transacted
within this state during the taxable year."' 5 - Such an income
tax statute creates problems of apportionment: What part of
the corporation's income was derived from "doing business"
in Colorado?
An example of the Colorado Supreme Court's approach
to apportionment is Cruse v. Stayput Clamp & Coupling Co.'
The defendant corporation had its only office and manufactur-
ing plant in Colorado, and it maintained no other inventory.
The company received orders in Colorado and shipped them
"to the destination, sometimes c.o.d., sometimes on open ac-
count, sometimes f.o.b. Denver, sometimes f.o.b. destination."'"
4
The state tax commissioner argued that defendant's entire net
income equaled his net income in Colorado for section 2(b).
The corporation answered by characterizing its Colorado net
i4" 204 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added).
150 Id. at 114.
351 Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
152 Ch. 175, § 2(b), [1937] Colo. Sess. Laws 679.
353 113 Colo. 254, 156 P.2d 397 (1945).
154 Id. at 257, 156 P.2d at 398.
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income as sales "completed by delivery in Colorado to Colorado
purchasers.' '155
After reviewing various decisions from other states, the
court concluded that the tax commissioner's assessment was
correct and upheld the following principle:
[A] state may impose a nondiscriminatory tax on net income
derived from transactions in interstate commerce as well as from
other sources without violating any constitutional provision. 156
In contrast to this case, Colorado v. American Can Co.
1 57
held that a foreign corporation which had carefully selected
its contacts could not be taxed on its total net income. Here
the tax assessment was based on income derived from retail
sales made to customers in Colorado. The defendant argued
that the orders, although taken in Colorado, were transmitted
to New Jersey for acceptance. The product was shipped from
warehouses outside of Colorado f.o.b. to a point of delivery
also outside the state. There, the product was picked up by
carrier for delivery to a retail purchaser in Colorado. The cor-
poration was authorized to do business in Colorado and main-
tained a Colorado warehouse from which it made sales to local
customers.
158
The court, in seeking to apportion the income derived from
transacting business in the state, broke the business into na-
tional, totally Coloradan (from the local warehouse), and busi-
ness in goods delivered outside the state for Colorado cus-
tomers. The court held that the corporation's net income for
the state tax was to be limited to the sales made from the
Colorado warehouse.
Thus, the argument made by the corporation in Stayput
Clamp appears to have found acceptance in American Can.
The court rationalized this difference by noting that the cor-
poration in Stayput Clamp had all of its property in Colorado,
and therefore the "transacting business" test could be avoided.
b. After 1951
In 1951, the income tax law was altered to accelerate the
corporate tax to 5 percent. 159 Complementing this increment was
a change in the statutory language. The amended statute taxes
the following:
155 Id. at 258-59, 156 P.2d at 399.
156 Id. at 264, 156 P.2d at 401.
357 117 Colo. 312, 186 P.2d 779 (1947).
158 Note that under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-5-2(22) (Supp. 1967) this
type of transaction would be subject to sales and use tax.
159Ch. 196, § 2(b) (2), [1951] Colo. Sess. Laws 453.
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[T]he net income of every corporation derived from sources
within this state .... Income from sources within this state
includes income from tangible or intangible property located or
having a situs in this state and income from any activities car-
ried on in this state, regardless of whether carried on in intra-
state, interstate or foreign commerce.160
This new language, which would seem to cover the Amer-
ican Can situation, is clearly differentiated from the old statute
in Arvey Corp. v. Fugate."' Here the director-inventor of a
corporation left the business, took some key employees with
him, and created a new company authorized to do business in
Colorado. The original corporation filed an action to enjoin the
activities of this new business on the basis that the director-
inventor was bound contractually and as a fiduciary to the
plaintiff. In winning the suit, the corporation received all the
gains and profits that the new Colorado corporation had ob-
tained during a certain accounting period.162 The state tax
commissioner promptly stepped in and levied an income tax
on these gains and profits.
In defense, the corporation argued that it was never domi-
ciled in Colorado, had no property in the state, had never
engaged in business or carried on commerce in Colorado, and
had no office there. It further contended that it had never
received income from sources within the state, directly or in-
directly, and the rights obtained from the earlier litigation were
an intangible whose situs was the domicile of the defendant.
In analyzing the new statute, the court held that "income
from sources within this state" was to be interpreted as "broad
and all inclusive."'163 The previous cases of Stayput Clamp and
American Can were held to be inapplicable because they used
the older test of "business transacted within the state" while
Fugate involved the new statute's "income from sources within
the state." Note also that "doing business" is no longer the test
but has been replaced by the carrying on of any activity.
The court held the source of the income to have its situs
at the location of the business activity. The conclusion was that
the "monies it received was [sic] income; that such income
constituted the profits from the operation of a Colorado cor-
poration; and therefore the source of the income was confined
strictly to Colorado.'
164
IN Id. § 2(b) (1) (emphasis added).
161 129 Colo. 595, 272 P.2d 652 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 871 (1954).
16 2 Hyman & Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 123 Colo. 563, 233 P.2d 977 (1951).
163 129 Colo. at 599, 272 P.2d at 655.
164 Id. at 600, 272 P.2d at 655.
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Although there have been no cases interpreting the current
section 138-1-3, this case gives a definite preview of what a
foreign corporation can expect when trying to avoid the state's
income tax. As with the 1965 long arm statute, this new law
definitely expands the state's power. "Income derived from
sources" within the state will probably be interpreted as liberal-
ly as the "arising from" test in the tortious act area. As with tort,
it is no longer necessary to prove that the foreign corporation
was actually "doing business" in the state. Today, the "transac-
tion of business" is no longer in the statute. The test has been
broadened to "activities carried on in this state."' 6 5 Thus, the
tax commissioner's burden of proof has been minimized.
D. Summary
The taxation question is still limited by the Supreme Court
cases noted earlier. Any tax is vulnerable to an attack on the
grounds of discrimination or undue burden on interstate com-
merce. The "doing business" test for sales and use taxation
requires more proof than the "doing business" test for service
of process but less than the "doing business" test for qualifica-
tion. Franchise taxation is limited to corporations already quali-
fied to do business, and, for income tax purposes, the "doing
business" test has been eliminated.
As discussed, it appears that both the Colorado license tax
and the definition of "doing business" for sales and use taxa-
tion are subject to basic constitutional challenges. The former
is discriminatory and impairs the state's contractual obligation,
while the sales and use tax extends the power of the state
beyond its boundaries because of a lack of proper nexus and
interference with interstate commerce.
CONCLUSION
Although "doing business" can never be precisely defined,
this note has attempted to narrow the scope of the phrase as
it applies in Colorado. There are certain statutes or cases which
have managed to directly connect the term with the three
areas of conflict. In service of process, the "tortious act" test
has grown since its 1965 inception through the "ultimate use"
standard outlined in Vandermee and Czarnick. For contract,
the possible expansion of jurisdiction through the phrase "aris-
ing from" may alter the balancing of contacts test which has
been adhered to in the past. The issue of qualification has
been largely mooted in Colorado by the relaxed penalties and
165 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-35 (Supp. 1965), as amended (Supp.
1969).
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the judicial interpretation of abatement in the Admiral Corp.
case. The sales and use tax statute which defines "doing busi-
ness" appears to place an undue burden on interstate com-
merce through its inclusion of solicitation as a substantial
contact. The licensing tax is also subject to constitutional chal-
lenge because of its obvious discrimination when compared to
the franchise tax on domestic corporations. Finally, the income
tax statute has eliminated the "doing business" test in order
to adopt the more expansive standard of "activities carried on."
This, when combined with the potentially broad language of
"income derived from," implies a future extension of Colo-
rado's taxation on the income of foreign corporations.
Thus, the general trend in Colorado has been to expand
the state's power over foreign corporations by bringing them
into local courts and levying state taxes upon these businesses.
With the sole exception of the qualification standards, the leg-
islature and the courts are unanimous in their approval of
treating out-of-state corporations more like local citizens than
foreign ones. In the process of acquiring this power, certain
constitutional restrictions have apparently been ignored.
Roger W. Arrington

